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Abstract—Changing lanes is a commonly-used technique for
drivers to either overtake slow-moving cars or enter/exit highway
ramps. Optional lane changes may save drivers travel time but
increase the risk of collision with others. Drivers make such
decisions based on experience and emotion rather than analysis,
and thus may fail to select the best solution while in a dynamic
state of flux. Unlike human drivers, autonomous vehicles can
systematically analyze their surroundings and make real-time
decisions accordingly. This paper develops a game theory-based
lane-changing model by comparing two types of optimization
methods. To realize our expectations, we need to first investigate
the payoff function of drivers in discretionary lane-changing
maneuvers and then quantify it in an equation of costs that
trades-off safety and time-saving. After the evaluation for each
alternative strategy combination, the results show that there
exists a social gap in the discretionary lane-changing game. To
deal with that problem, we provide some suggestions for future
policy as well as autonomous vehicle controller designs, offering
solutions to reduce the impact of disturbances and crashes caused
by inappropriate lane changes, and also, inspire further research
about more complex cases.
Index Terms—Discretionary lane changing, game theory, au-
tonomous vehicles, human-driven vehicles, social dilemma
I. INTRODUCTION
DESPITE their low frequency, lane-changing (LC) ma-neuvers result in 5% of all crashes and 7% of all road
fatalities [1]. In the US, two-vehicle lane change crashes
comprised 9% of all police-reported automobile crashes [2].
Some research finds that LC is the main reason for shockwaves
and congestion reducing road efficiency [3], [4]. ‘Smart’ lane
changes could fill gaps in traffic, weakening the impacts of
blockage by slow-moving cars [5]. Ideally drivers learn from
driver training and experience to decide how and when it is
appropriate to change lanes by checking mirrors to observe
the surroundings, but these checks are unreliable in complex
or low visibility scenarios. Autonomous Vehicles (AV), with
their anticipated capability of detecting traffic conditions with
sensors and cameras and short response time, are expected to
complete this task with fewer adverse safety outcomes [6],
[7]. However, the effects on traffic flow as a whole from AV
lane changes in mixed or autonomous-only traffic has yet to
be determined.
For human drivers, in general, the reasoning decisions are
executed due to the possibility, necessity, and desirability of
LC behaviors [8]. As with many things, LC decisions must
trade-off between ‘greed’ vs. ‘fear’. Drivers are ‘greedy’ to
save time but they also ‘fear’ the loss associated with crashes.
Efforts to prevent crashes, such as paying attention during
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driving activities, also influence the utility [9]–[11]. The aim
of these research efforts is to determine a comprehensive driver
lane-changing payoff function for exploring the conditions of
safe and appropriate lane changes to improve social welfare.
Lane changing factors include speed advantage (the desired
lane is faster than the current one) [8], [12], [13], acceleration
advantage [14], and safety issues [15], [16]. However, the
hypotheses, as mentioned above, cannot be directly verified
by datasets collected from real road sections because even
though drivers’ actual behaviors are observable, the underlying
processes of their consideration are not, and actual execution
remains hard to predict. At the same time, the heterogeneity
of drivers (who are from different backgrounds, genders, ages,
etc.) increases the complexity of prediction.
The continuous process of all driver activities like changing
lanes on roads has been summarized into three main levels:
strategic, tactical, and operational [17]. Game theory (GT)
can explain for the first two levels [18], [19]. GT has been
widely implemented in various fields for interpretation of the
human decision-making process. In the domain of driver LC
strategies, game theory was introduced by Kita [20], creating
a new type of behavioral model. That model demonstrates the
feasibility of game theory to describe the interaction of drivers
in LC scenarios and inspired other similar research [21]–
[24]. To facilitate this complex scenario, most of the models
assumed a two-player game with two strategies and complete
information for each player. The merging car has two alterna-
tives: execute the lane change or stay in the current lane. The
through car driving in the target lane can also choose to either
yield to the merging car, or not yield but accelerate to block
the intended lane change.
This article proposes an innovative discretionary lane-
changing (DLC) framework based on classic game theory,
which also considers social cooperation behaviors. Cooper-
ative players behave in a way that benefits the system, non-
cooperative players benefit only themselves. A lane-changing
vehicle may behave non-cooperatively, causing vehicles in
the target lane to brake, and, though we do not consider it
here, congest an already congested lane while departing a less
congested lane. A driver in the target lane may behave non-
cooperatively in a way to make the lane changing vehicle’s
strategy more difficult by not yielding. Unlike other research,
the model compares user-optimal (UO) behaviors (like most
human drivers) and social-optimal (SO) behaviors (like hy-
pothetical selfless drivers, but possible for AVs under specific
algorithms). By comparing the results of these two models, we
demonstrate in which cases drivers would ‘cooperate’ with
each other or ‘defect’, behaving non-cooperatively in game
2theory terms, and work selfishly. We believe this research
provides a framework to promote better AV algorithm design
for more efficient and safer roads.
A companion paper reviews recent GT-based models of lane
changing in depth [25]. The rest of this paper is structured as
follows. In section II, we further discuss and compare UO
and SO models. We then introduce the methodology of the
proposed model and the details of the case study in section III.
The model is validated in section IV. In section V, the results
from the study are examined if the model is feasible to explain
LC maneuvers. In the meanwhile, by comparing the test results
of the UO controller and the SO controller, we find the reasons
why in some cases drivers behave aggressively but sometimes
not, and try to explore ways to change the game rules. Finally,
in section VI, we summarize our findings, conclude, and
provide some expectations for future investigation.
II. REVIEW OF GAME THEORETIC MODELS
For the purpose of highlighting the difference between UO
and SO behaviors, this section compares previous models that
apply these two algorithms. Based on the priority of the client
itself or the whole traffic system, a new categorization system
of GT-based LC models is created including user-optimal
models that promote the driver’s own benefit only, social-
optimal models that maximize the total welfare of the society,
and hybrid user and social-optimized models that balance user
experience and system efficiency.
A. User-optimal models
Following Nash’s User Equilibrium principle, drivers com-
pete to achieve the maximum net individual benefit subject
to the same selfish choices of others [22]. Most GT models
choose the UO method not only due to the well-developed
concept but also because of the simple computation algorithm
[26]–[28]. These models retain the assumption that all drivers
are rational, and they fully (with complete information) or
partly (with incomplete information) understand each other.
Although the UO models perform well in many real cases
and may be applied in current AV algorithms, they fail to
consider the behaviors of cooperators also playing games. That
may cause UO agents to wrongly predict others’ strategies for
interactions with selfless human drivers because they make
decisions on the premise that all players are selfishly rational.
Furthermore, though assuming all players in the traffic system
follow these models, they may not achieve a win-win result
since they reduce their opponents’ benefits even if the overall
situation worsens. Consequently, the models that optimize
their strategies based on classic Nash Equilibrium are not
appropriate to simulate the scenarios with the occurrence of
the conflict between individuals and the group. There should
be another type of model to describe drivers’ cooperative
behaviors for a better outcome with that conflict.
B. Social-optimal models
The strategies from Nash’s User Equilibrium might reduce
the total payoff to society because concern for individual
short-term benefits ignores the group’s long-term welfare
[29], [30]. Evolutionary Game Theory and its social viscos-
ity mechanisms can increase cooperation rates, and improve
system efficiency [30], [31]. The mechanisms mainly aim to
establish internal relationships among individuals or external
relationships of groups, so players in games will gradually
cooperate more frequently if they know their opponents well.
More details about the reciprocity mechanisms can be seen in
[32]. Nevertheless, due to its long evolutionary process and
high reliance on specific conditions like initial cooperation
rates and specific densities, the EGT-based models must be
modified to enable more realistic LC games.
There is another problem to be solved that before knowing
that the opponent is willing to cooperate to get more benefits,
the player may feel afraid that the opponent will aggressively
‘defect’ (exploit their cooperative behavior) so the driver may
in the end be unwilling to cooperate. While we cannot change
their minds or stifle their human nature, it may be possible
to adjust the game rules to make the competition fair to both
cooperators and non-cooperators to encourage the likelihood
that more socially beneficial payoffs result. Alternatively, to
increase system efficiency in congested conditions, authorities
can provide preferential treatments to encourage cooperative
behavior, or discourage or restrict non-cooperative agents
from their aggressive behavior. In uncongested scenarios, such
as freely flowing sections, authorities can permit drivers to
behave selfishly without penalty.
C. Hybrid (User and Social-optimal) models
A combined cost function includes both non-cooperative
and cooperative costs for connected vehicles when regarding
the latter as the extra cost of the control action [33] . A recent
study also considered possible charges for selfish LC behaviors
(like changing lanes in an over-crowded road section) to reduce
the congestion designed for connected vehicles [34].
III. METHODOLOGY
The main differences of various GT-based models are the
factors considered in the payoff functions and the solution(s)
to optimize for either the individual or the system. This
section first presents the structure of the payoff function
and optimization methods of our proposed model. After that,
simulation experiment tests whether the model performs well
with the calibrated parameters after validation by real datasets.
A. Energy vs. Momentum Conservation Equations
The safety variables can be understood from two perspec-
tives: the severity and the probability of crashes. Before the
estimation of the overall safety cost, we suggest a new method
for severity evaluation, which shows a better fit to estimate the
impact of crashes than previous studies. The theory behind this
method is that the kinetic energy due to the vehicle’s motion
suddenly declines during a collision. Although most of the
energy is released in the form of heat and sound, the rest of
the impact energy is absorbed by structural deformation of the
vehicle’s metal and by the occupants themselves. Occupants,
3belted or otherwise, are finally forced to collide with the
interior surface, causing injuries.
We compare this approach with the widely-used Delta-
V model recommended by National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA) [35].
∆v1 = −m2(v1 − v2)
m1 +m2
, ∆v2 =
m1(v1 − v2)
m1 +m2
(1)
where:
1 and 2 identify the two vehicles;
∆v1,2 is the Delta-V of vehicle 1 or 2 in this collision;
m1,2 is the dry weight of vehicle 1 or 2;
v1,2 is the collision speed of vehicle 1 or 2;
By combining the Energy Conservation Equation and the
Momentum Conservation Equation, the energy loss WL from
a specific crash can be computed when assuming a perfectly
inelastic collision (vehicles ‘stick to each other’ after the
collision):
WL = 0.5 · m1m2(v1 − v2)
2
(m1 +m2)
(2)
The energy loss in the collision then distributes to two
vehicles and finally imposes on occupants according to two
effects of the mass ratio of vehicles: ‘hostile effect’ and
‘protective effect’ [36]. The hostile effect refers to the effect
that the lighter vehicle tends to receive a more substantial
Delta-V in a crash, as demonstrated in (1). Furthermore,
another effect called the protective effect means heavy vehicles
usually contain more inherent protection and other designs
that help to absorb the impact energy from a crash, but it
also depends on the size and structure of vehicles. Therefore,
the power of the mass ratio α will be estimated later by the
regression from real data.
WL1
WL2
=
(
m1
m2
)α
(3)
WL1 = 0.5 ·
(m1m2 )
α
1 + (m1m2 )
α
m1m2(v1 − v2)2
m1 +m2
WL2 = 0.5 ·
(m2m1 )
α
1 + (m2m1 )
α
m1m2(v1 − v2)2
m1 +m2
(4)
in which:
WL1,2 is the energy absorption by vehicle 1 or 2;
α is the power of the mass ratio that reflects the individual
energy absorption.
Also, the energy loss equation for each vehicle can be
transformed with the forms of Delta-V as,
WL1 = 0.5 ·
(m1m2 )
α−1
1 + (m1m2 )
α
(m1 +m2)∆v
2
1
WL2 = 0.5 ·
(m2m1 )
α−1
1 + (m2m1 )
α
(m1 +m2)∆v
2
2
(5)
TABLE I
COMPARISON OF TWO TYPES OF SEVERITY ESTIMATED VARIABLES
Estimate Standard Error Pr(> |z|) AIC Deviance
Delta-V 0.004161 0.001387 0.00271 3334.09 3325.59
ELVIS 5.69E-08 1.82E-08 0.00172 3333.27 3324.22
B. Expected crash cost estimation function
We hypothesize that when the value of the energy loss
increases, the cost of the crash rises rapidly. The relationships
are given as:
∂CL
∂WL
> 0
∂WL
∂ VM
> 0 (6)
where:
CL denotes the expected crash cost, and
VM is the category of Maximum Abbreviated Injury Scale
(MAIS) (from 0 to 6+).
According to these relationships, we establish an energy
loss-based vehicular injury severity function (ELVIS). We
estimate the power ratio parameter α from the injury causation
datasets of Crash Injury Research and Engineering Network
(CIREN) [37]. The analysis includes two-vehicle crashes only.
The parameter β unifies crash loss per collision with severity
probability and time cost into the same quantity and it is
calibrated with real data.
CL = β · (CS(VM ) · PS(WL)) (7)
where:
CL is the estimated crash loss from the expected collision;
CS(VM ) is the corresponding empirical cost at each level of
MAIS;
PS(WL) is the maximum severity probability of each level of
MAIS based on the energy loss.
The severity measurement is represented by MAIS that
judges the most serious occupant injury in an observed crash.
MAIS classifies crashes into 7 categories: 0- Property Damage
Only, 1-Minor Injury, 2-Moderate Injury, 3-Serious Injury, 4-
Severe Injury, 5-Major Injury, and 6+-Fatality (Untreatable
cases). Because of the categorical and ordinal nature of
variable MAIS, we calibrate the function using an ordered
logistic regression model with a probit link function due to its
better fit compared to logit.
To test the validity of the severity function, the model based
on the Delta-V method will be introduced to compare with the
ELVIS function by the Akaike information criterion (AIC) [38]
and deviance. Moreover, P-value tests are also conducted to
check whether the models are statistically significant or not.
When α = −0.5, the results show that ELVIS fits the injuries
and fatalities better, as listed in Table I.
After getting the predicted probability of each MAIS from
the regression model, the expected crash cost considering the
lost quality of life can be estimated by choosing the maximum
probability among all categories. Figure 1 shows the estimated
economic costs of each level of MAIS [39].
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Fig. 1. Comprehensive economic unit costs of reported and unreported
crashes [39]
Then, the risk probability of crashes (PC) should depend on
the speed difference and the distance between the preceding
car and the following car. When the speed difference, which
is also the approaching speed (vd = vfollowing − vpreceding),
becomes large or the distance is relatively small, the risk
increases. The relationships are:
∂PC
∂vd
> 0
∂PC
∂D
< 0 (8)
where:
PC is the risk of crashes, and
D is the bumper-to-bumper distance gap between two vehicles.
To satisfy the above requirements for the crash risk predic-
tion, we adapt a surrogate safety assessment, time-to-collision
(TTC) [40], [41], to measure the crash risk and apply it for
LC maneuvers. For car-following cases, the model considers
rear-end collision wherein the following vehicle cannot brake
sufficiently before the crash. It measures the probability of
crashes [42]:
PC =
{
exp
[
−
(
TTC
σ
2
)]
vd > 0
0 vd ≤ 0
(9)
where:
TTC is the time-to-collision safety measurement, and
σ is a constant scaling number assumed to be an average
driver reaction time of 1.5 seconds.
C. Driver payoff function
To apply game theory to reveal the driver’s decision-making
process in LC maneuvers, the first challenge is knowing the
payoff function that drivers may gain from their choices. Gen-
erally speaking, this depends on human characteristics, that is,
drivers from different backgrounds, genders, ages, etc. value
different factors in diverse ways. Nevertheless, the common
point is that they are greedy to get more travel time savings
while they also fear the possible risks of loss. Considering the
TABLE II
THE PAYOFF TABLE OF EACH STRATEGY IN LC GAMES
Player I
Pl
ay
er
J Give way (q) Not yield (1− q)
Change lanes (p) UI(A,A), UJ (A,A) UI(A,B), UJ (A,B)
Stay (1− p) UI(B,A), UJ (B,A) UI(B,B), UJ (B,B)
If UI(A,A) + UJ (A,A) is the minimum total cost and UI(A,B) and
UJ (A,B) are pure Nash equilibrium solutions, the cell in red represents
the social-optimal scenario while the cell in blue indicates the user-optimal
scenario.
aggressiveness of different drivers, we introduce a factor of γ
ranging from 0 to 1 to weight the importance of saving time
vs. reducing the risk [21], [43]. We also assume a Value of
Time (VOT) to evaluate the time cost component of different
scenarios. An unobserved explanatory variable is added to
present the factors that are not currently investigated in order
to increase the error tolerance of this model.
As for the extra time spent in different strategies, we create
parallel worlds to calculate the travel time difference Ts of
worlds with different consequences when players conclude
their LC games [34]. The product of VOT and the time saving
is the estimated cost of extra time spent, which contributes to
the total cost before drivers choose one of the strategies.
Here, for simplification, we ignore the unobservable ex-
planatory variable (ε) for this research. Now, by combining
the expression of the safety cost part into the function, we can
construct the overall driver payoff function as:
Cz,total = γ × Pz,C · Cz,L + (1− γ) × Vz,T · Tz,s (10)
where:
z is the indicator of players (1 or 2);
Vz,T is the Value of Time of player z;
Tz,s means the extra time spent compared to the fastest case.
It equals 0 when the scenario is the fastest one.
D. Optimization methods
A 2×2 game for LC maneuvers, and the payoff table for LC
games is displayed in Table II. For this model, we design from
two considerations: the user-optimal (UO), Nash Equilibrium
based model and the social-optimal (SO) model. They adopt
different algorithms to find the solution(s). It should be noted
that the costs of driver choices are a kind of disutility. Drivers
prefer to earn more benefits and also reduce their loss or
costs. Therefore, the lower the expected costs, the more the
willingness for the corresponding strategies.
For the SO solution, by following Pareto Optimality the-
ory [44], we can directly resolve at which point(s) the total cost
Ut reaches the minimum value and then find its corresponding
pure strategies for two players. That means one strategy will
not be a cooperative strategy all the time. For a specific strat-
egy, it could be the cooperative strategy in the current situation
but may switch to the non-cooperative behavior depending on
5the varying conditions. The social-optimal algorithm for Player
I is given by (Player J is identical but for subscripts):
UI,SO =
{
UI(A,A|B) if Ut(A,A|B) = min(Ut(A,A|B), Ut(B,A|B))
UI(B,A|B) if Ut(B,A|B) = min(Ut(A,A|B), Ut(B,A|B))
(11)
The classic Nash Equilibrium can realize the user optimiza-
tion because it has been proven that for every finite game at
least one NE exists when considering mixed strategies [45].
When a strategy meets certain requirements, this strategy is the
pure strategy adopted by one player during the whole game.
However, when it fails to satisfy the conditions, players
tend to apply mixed strategies according to the computed
possibilities of each strategy. To compare the payoffs of mixed
strategies to pure strategies, we calculate the expected payoff
of mixed strategies. For example, if the probability for Player
I to change lanes is p and for Player J to give way is q, the
overall user optimization algorithm for Player I will be:
UI,UO =

UI(A,A|B) if UI(A,A) < UI(B,A) and UI(A,B) < UI(B,B)
UI(B,A|B) if UI(A,A) > UI(B,A) and UI(A,B) > UI(B,B)
pqUI(A,A) + p(1− q)UI(A,B) + (1− p)qUI(B,A)
+(1− p)(1− q)UI(B,B) otherwise
(12)
The algorithm of Player J is quite similar to the expression
above. These two optimization algorithms will then be de-
ployed to determine which strategy will be selected depending
on two different modes in each LC game. The payoff of every
designed game will be plotted into the contour to check the
payoff difference between two models.
IV. MODEL VALIDATION
To examine whether real cases align with models and
assumptions introduced earlier, we adopt the 45-minute trajec-
tory dataset, including lane records collected from southbound
Highway US-101 in June 2005 [46]. The flow chart (Figure 2)
shows the filtered available LC information, so 744 cases in
total are used for validation. Due to missing information that
this dataset cannot provide, it is assumed that the expected
MAIS of two vehicles are the same, 3-Serious Injury. In
addition, both drivers are assumed to neutrally value reducing
crash risks and reducing travel time (γ = 0.5), and VT aligns
with the assumption for every driver (VT = 25 $/hour). Note
these simplifications limit the predictive capabilities of models.
We extract the speed profiles of two competing vehicles
from trajectories and then present examples of different sce-
narios in Figure 3. In these profiles, ‘LC point’ refers to
the time when two vehicles start to take action. To identify
the strategies that real drivers adopt, we set acceleration and
deceleration rate thresholds as 2 m/s and −3 m/s. Therefore,
behaviors with significant acceleration or deceleration values
that exceed thresholds can be judged as specific strategies, for
example, Change lanes (a > 2 m/s) and Stay (a < −3 m/s).
To check differences between observations and predictions,
we fit the observed and predicted choices of drivers with
their payoffs in LC games. By bringing the median values
of two probability distributions closer, the model parameter β
is calibrated as 3.2× 10−4. The realistic behaviors generated
by the model heavily rely on the exact estimation of β.
All Lane changes from datasets 
(2,575 cases)
Start
With followers in target lanes 
(1,811 cases)
Discretionary lane 
changes 
(1,739 cases)
Single lane changes 
(LC time interval > 4 s) 
(1,315 cases)
Failed lane changes 
(LC time interval <2 s, 
return to original lanes) 
(300 cases)
Without followers 
(764 cases)
Mandatory lane changes 
(72 cases)
Accelerating 
(a > 2 m/s2  &  
10+ speed increase) 
(547 cases)
Decelerating 
(a < -3 m/s2 &  
10+ speed decrease) 
(197 cases)
No extreme speed changes 
(571 cases)
Multiple lane changes 
(LC time interval < 4 s 
move to other lanes) 
(124 cases)
End
Fig. 2. The validation process filtering available data
Other advanced estimating methods would help improve the
practicality of predictions in future models, but we have only
found this estimation valid so far.
Figure 4 demonstrates two probability distributions from
model outcomes and reality, the left side of the figure is
for the merging cars, the right side for the through cars in
the target lane. They present how the strategy probabilities
are distributed throughout the proportion of cars (density)
dropping in that probability. The yellow vertical represents the
model prediction, which is concentrated at 100% for merging
cars, indicating a high payoff for accelerating by the lane
changing vehicle, which the median value observed is about
74% as shown in gray, indicating actual drivers are less willing
to accelerate than predicted. The yellow bar is concentrated at
0% for most through cars, indicating they are more likely not
to yield from a UO perspective, but about 12% do yield, as
shown in gray.
Agents with the UO model would always aim to maximize
individual benefit from games but not care about others. That is
why the probability distribution of UO seeks non-cooperative
strategies for both merging and through vehicles.
We input all initial conditions in two models, and again,
compare observed and predicted outcomes when translating
strategies into the binary values of 1 (Change lanes or Yield)
or 0 (Stay or Not Yield). Note we exploit the mathematical
6Fig. 3. Speed profiles of vehicles in lane-changing maneuvers, example cases
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Fig. 4. Probability distribution of strategy choices in simulation and in reality. For merging cars (left), 1.0 = probability of accelerating, 0.0 = probability of
decelerating. For through cars in the target lane (right), 1.0 = probability of yielding, 0.0 = probability of not yielding.
7TABLE III
VALIDATION RESULTS OF TWO MODELS
The user-optimal model Merging car Through car
Calibrated model parameter β 3.2× 10−4 3.2× 10−4
No. of validation cases 744 744
RMSE 0.5143 0.5479
MAE 0.2697 0.3045
expectation (as same as the possibilities of choosing ‘1’ in this
case) to represent outcomes with mixed NE strategies. Two
metrics, Root Mean Square Root (RMSE) and Mean Absolute
Error (MAE), are used in this validation. The results are shown
in Table III.
The validation results indicate that GT-based models predict
decisions of human drivers in LC maneuvers with an approx-
imate 30% false alarm rate and reasonable values of RMSE.
Our results compare favorably with the accuracy of validation
studies in [24], 72.4% false predictions for discretionary LC
scenarios. However, given the simplifying parameter assump-
tions required by the available data, we cannot replicate the ac-
tual strategies with high accuracy using GT models. One of the
reasons could be that real LC scenarios are more complicated
than two players with two simple choices. Also, not all drivers
are entirely rational (in game theory, all players are assumed to
behave rationally). Thus, they may make decisions depending
on more factors (such as their aggressiveness) that have not
been explored in this validation process. Further investigations
for the decision-making process of human drivers would help
in this regard.
In summary, there remain gaps between game-theoretical
models and real scenarios, arguing for future model develop-
ment and better data sets, but the model prediction errors are
within an acceptable range, and so will be employed for the
next step, which should be considered as stylized results.
V. CASE STUDY
A. Input parameters and assumptions
The lane changing game is designed to operate on a straight
highway section without any intersections. It is simplified
as a two-player game with complete information, consistent
with previous studies. Two autonomous agents make decisions
following the two algorithms mentioned before, and their final
payoff is recorded after the LC maneuvers finish. Table IV
summarizes the related specifications and parameters of two
agents involved in the following calculations. Player I , identi-
fied as an SUV, acts as the through car, and Player J , modeled
as a sedan, acts as the merging car. In terms of aggressiveness
factors, they are assumed as Player I behaves aggressively,
and Player J is more polite.
The game will be repeated with all parameters fixed except
the initial distance and the speed difference between two
players. The initial distance can be changed by moving the
original position of one player but within the range of 15
to 30 m. Various initial speeds for Player J (v(J)) will also
be tested to check whether the speed difference influences
the trend or not when determining a fixed initial distance
between players. Note that this study is not a repeated game,
TABLE IV
SPECIFICATIONS AND RELATED PARAMETERS OF TWO TEST OBJECTS
Parameters Player I Player J
(SUV) (Sedan)
Length (m) 4.932 4.594
Weight (kg) 1,725 1,528
Initial Speed (m/s) v(I) = 15 v(J) = [20, 22]
Position (m) X(I) = [15, 30] 0
Acceleration (m2/s) 2.5 2.5
Deceleration (m2/s) 5 5
Maximum Speed (m/s) 30 30
Minimum Speed (m/s) 10 10
Calibrated model parameter β 3.2× 10−4 3.2× 10−4
Aggressiveness Factor γ 0.6 0.4
Value of Time VT ($/hour) 25 25
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Fig. 5. The payoff contour of user-optimal and social-optimal models for the
merging car (v(J) = 20m/s)
as described in classic game theory. A repeated game would
use the same players in the game multiple times, enabling
them to learn from their previous play and accordingly adjust
their strategies. This experiment assumes that players are
memoryless.
Each LC game, starts when we begin to count the first time
step. Throughout the whole game, all vehicles are assumed
to apply the same acceleration of 2.5 m2/s and deceleration
of 5 m2/s. In this experiment, the range of the speed is
constrained between 10 and 30 m/s.
B. Simulation test
The first test checks the effect of varying initial distance on
agents’ strategies and their payoff. The payoff contour for two
different models is plotted for the merging agent in Figure 5.
At the beginning of the contour (below 19.2 m), the total cost
when agents make choices according to Nash Equilibrium
(NE) is much higher than the social optimal (SO) strategy.
When the initial distance is relatively short (e.g., from 19.2
to 22.8 m), the UO agent (plotted by the blue dashed line)
incurs less expense when it behaves aggressively, while the
SO agent (plotted by the orange dash line) incurs a higher
personal cost due to its cooperative behaviors. Therefore, their
UO total cost (solid blue line) is much higher than the SO total
8cost (solid orange line). However, when the distance increases,
these two dashed lines effectively coincide with each other and
continue to decline.
At the early stage, agents do not have a pure strategy
based on Nash Equilibrium but use a mixed strategy instead
to respond to others. Agents incur a considerable cost when
adopting the high-cost strategy even for a small probability.
That is the most critical case because they randomly select one
of the strategies when their opponents’ behaviors are hard to
predict. When agents keep a relatively short distance between
each other, the one that refuses to cooperate obtains relatively
more individual benefits from its selfish behavior (change lanes
or do not yield); however, the system cost becomes higher
when more drivers decide not to cooperate. The difference
between NE and SO costs at the second stage is defined as
the ‘social gap’ that occurs in every time interval where the
social dilemma exists. It is similar to the ‘price of anarchy’ in
the route choice literature [47], which is a ratio, rather than a
difference.
In contrast, for the low-density scenarios, the social dilemma
effectively disappears, and the NE model quickly starts to
follow the SO behavior. That is because the distance between
players is large enough for their non-cooperative behaviors
to pose minimal potential risk. When we check the actual
strategies used by agents, it is found that the merging car
finally decides to change lanes, and the through car chooses
not to yield, which are typically regarded as ‘aggressive’
behaviors. That means the expected crash cost has been
decreased to an acceptable range (defined as a ‘dilemma-free’
distance) for drivers to take less risk but save more travel time
for themselves.
The second set of tests changes the initial speed difference
of two drivers and compares their respective payoff contours.
To display results more clearly, only individual costs are
plotted with five levels of merging speeds. The results in
Figure 6 indicate that the trends are quite similar among
scenarios with various speed differences. The individual costs
of players with a large speed difference are less than the
costs with a small speed difference. Meanwhile, the social gap
also reduces with the enlargement of their speed difference.
For instance, comparing to the maximum social gap with
v(J) = 20 m/s as $0.0031, the one with v(J) = 22 m/s
is $0.0018. However, the range of the most critical stage
is extended due to the large speed difference, as shown in
the first stage of Figure 5, where driver strategies are highly
unpredictable.
Therefore, when the speed differences are small, extra costs
are incurred to finish the LC maneuver compared to situations
with large speed differences. The reason is that the large speed
difference reduces the time required to finish the whole LC
maneuver. That means the large speed difference accelerates
the completion of the game to mitigate the costs that players
suffer. However, it also leads to a wide range in which mixed
strategies exist, so players adopt high-cost strategies more
often in this case.
The results from these tests demonstrate that the increase
of initial distance (the distance when the LC game starts) is
able to weaken the social dilemma effect. In addition, the
Fig. 6. The payoff contour of user-optimal and social-optimal models with
multiple v(J)
large speed difference can reduce the required LC duration
or distance so that drivers can finish their maneuver swiftly
as desired, but it also increases the probability of high-cost
strategy adoption. Future AV controllers aiming for an SO
strategy could consider this in their LC module design.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK
To better describe intelligent discretionary lane-changing
behaviors, we introduce a classic game theory model with
the assumption that two drivers (players) compete in a game
under the premise of their full understanding of their oppo-
nent’s strategy. Meanwhile, to fulfill the core requirement (the
payoff function) of the GT application, players’ real costs
when making decisions in LC games are quantified with a
payoff function, including safety and time-efficiency factors.
A validation approach, based on human driver lane-recording
datasets, delimits the prediction capability of this simplified
model. Further progress of the validation process is left for
subsequent studies.
This paper compares social-optimal (SO) and user-optimal
(UO) (based on Nash Equilibrium (NE)) models and inves-
tigates the motivation of drivers to behave selfishly so that
a series of case studies are conducted. In the first set of
simulations, the initial distances of two vehicles are varied
to check if there is a situation that the social dilemma can
be eliminated with other parameters fixed. The second set of
simulations investigates the impact of different levels of the
speed difference.
When the initial gap is fairly short, drivers may adopt less-
safe strategies due to having no pure choices. After the initial
distance increases to a minimum distance threshold, drivers
can behave non-cooperatively to obtain more personal benefits.
In that case, they maximize their selfish gains though non-
cooperative behaviors increase the extra social cost to the cost
of both cooperators and the whole system. Finally, when the
initial distance reaches the so-called ‘dilemma-free’ distance,
the SO model aligns with the UO model. Due to the long
distance to be considered, drivers are more likely to engage
9in selfish strategies. In other words, it makes their aggressive
behaviors less risky so that the overall costs for those behaviors
effectively, and then most drivers choose to apply SO. As for
the second test, the large speed difference leads to a lower cost
and social gap, which promotes the fast completion of the LC
process. However, it also extends the interval where possible
costly choices are adopted by players, which worsens the total
system benefit.
To mitigate the social dilemma effect, the social gap in
congested conditions could be addressed either by policy
restrictions that charge drivers for inappropriate behaviors or
by modifications of AVs and Advanced Driver Assistance
System (ADAS) algorithms to consider this gap on the basis of
the current algorithm for better interaction with human drivers
and other AVs. Additionally, AVs are expected to avoid getting
involved into such situations as the critical first stage, so they
can appropriately approach the speeds of their opponents to
decrease the probability of an incident.
In future research, an effective car-following model, to-
gether with real parameters collected from highways, will
replace the values assumed here for a more realistic esti-
mation. Extensions that improve the estimation of the cost
scale parameter β may yield supplemental insights. More
scenarios that drivers may encounter in LC maneuvers (not
only including the specific situation in this study) should also
be investigated for other possible conclusions; for example, the
merging car is ahead of the through car but drives at a lower
speed. That should enrich the applications of this model for
different complex conditions for the possible deployment in
other simulation tools or on real roads.
Moreover, it may be useful to explore the three player-game
for LC behaviors, which should be more realistic in cases
where a third player significantly impacts on LC maneuvers.
Additionally, when discussing the interaction between human
drivers and AVs for the possible scenario with specific pen-
etration of AVs, we can explore the situations of all human
drivers, all AVs, and mix of them playing the LC game.
LC models rely on valid datasets from reliable sources.
These include vehicle trajectories and crash reports. In par-
ticular police reports may miss many unreported incidents. It
is expected that with the deployment of AVs and widespread
vehicle sensors, more detailed LC-related datasets will be
published. These will enable researchers to not only modify
current LC models but also promote the development of new
models for future research. Future work can verify the model
with other AV datasets. While some limitations exist in the
current proposed model, we believe it provides insights and
structures our understanding of how rational and cooperative
human drivers choose appropriate strategies and suggests
solutions to support safe and socially efficient travel behavior.
NOMENCLATURE
α the power of mass ratio, calibrated from crash injury
data
β the scale parameter of two costs, calibrated from
trajectory datasets
∆v Delta-V of one vehicle in a collision
γ the aggressiveness factor of drivers, ranged from 0 to
1
σ the constant scaling number related to driver reaction
time
a the current acceleration rate of vehicles
CL the estimated crash cost from the expected collision
CS the corresponding empirical value of life at each level
of MAIS
Ctotal overall cost for one player in games
D bumper-to-bumper distance gap between two vehicles
m the dry weight of vehicles
p the probability of Player J changes lanes
PC the probability of getting involved in crashes
PS the probability of injury severity at each level of MAIS
q the probability of Player I gives way
Ts the extra time spent compared to the fastest one
TTC the time to collision safety measurement
U the estimated payoff of drivers
v the current speed of vehicles
vd the approaching speed, = vfollowing − vpreceding
VM the category of MAIS (from 0 to 6+)
VT the value of time of drivers
WL the energy loss in a collision
X the current position of vehicles
z the ID of players (1 or 2)
MAIS maximum abbreviated injury scale
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